Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary Of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, spoke with Yasemin Çongar on CNN Turk
December 1, 2006 Washington, D.C.
Çongar: Mr. Bryza, good afternoon. Thank you for being with us.
Bryza: Good afternoon Yasemin.
Çongar: As you know, every now and then there is an article in the U.S. press that attracts a lot of attention in Turkey. This was the case, you might remember, with Rob Pollock’s article in the Wall Street Journal a couple of years ago in which Pollock called Turkey “The sick man of Europe.” Now there is this article in Newsweek which is talking about the likelihood of a coup d’etat in Turkey in the year 2007 and stating the chances of that as fifty-fifty. Let me ask you directly about that, because there is an uproar about it in Turkey and reactions from many people including the Prime Minister himself. Does the U.S. government believe that a coup d’etat or a military intervention of sorts is likely in Turkey in 2007?
Bryza: No. No, we definitely don’t believe any sort of military intervention is likely in Turkey now or anywhere into the foreseeable future. Having watched Turkey for a lot of years, I never see, I have never noticed a desire, a proclivity, a tendency of the Turkish military to want to intervene in the Turkish politics. I think that is absolutely true under the Chief of Defense, Chief of the General Staff General Büyükanıt. Turkey is, as we all know, an extremely rich mix of political currents and cultures and religions and it is a democracy. It is a secular democracy. Democracies are built upon… What a democracy means is that a mechanism exists through free speech and debate to resolve political differences. That is happening in Turkey. Turkish democracy is extremely healthy, there is nothing wrong with it. So we have every anticipation that Turkish democracy will succeed again, as it has, in resolving the current disputes, which are real.
Çongar: To my ears, at least, you are echoing what Ambassador Ross Wilson said a while ago. He stated that they did not see any reason to be worried about Turkey’s future as a strong, secular, democratic country. Do you share, though, Turkish military’s worries that radical Islam, or “irtica” as they call it, is penetrating the state institutions in Turkey?
Bryza: Well, it would be sort of, I don’t know, unfair to compare my level of knowledge with that of the Turkish military. Turkish military understands the situation on the ground infinitely better than I could, way over here in Washington, D.C. What I can say is, we recognize that and appreciate that precisely Turkey’s strong, secular, democratic institutions have found a way to allow for Islam to remain a cultural element in Turkish society, but to provide separateness so that the reach of Islam into private lives stays back, it doesn’t penetrate into public life. And that is thanks to the secular democratic institutions of Turkey, again which I said a moment ago, are strong, are healthy. Therefore we have faith that these institutions will resolve these differences. But of course, the differences are real. I mean we see the debate played out every day in the Turkish media and the Turkish press.
Çongar: The conventional belief in the Turkish media seems to be that the U.S. did indeed support the February 28 decisions of 1997, the so-called “postmodern coup d’etat” of the time. Is this true? And secondly, would the U.S. support an intervention of that kind in the foreseeable future?
Bryza: Well, I was not covering Turkey directly then. I was working on Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan, which I am so happy to note that, is functioning beautifully. I will talk about today. I am responsible for our relations today, partially responsible. The United States supports democratic resolutions of all such disputes in Turkey. Let me put it in a different way: Turkey matters to the United States in a deep, profound, strategic sense precisely because of its success as a secular democracy with a Muslim majority population. Turkey can inspire, through its example, can inspire democratic reformers throughout a broad region of the world. Drawing on its own historical experience, as I often talk about, as you know, dating back to the late Ottoman period, the 1840s, 50s and the Tanzimat period, Turkey has helped to advance modernizing reforms in places like Cairo and Damascus 150 years ago, before anybody else was really talking about that in the Middle East. That is what really matters to us in Turkey. So if Turkey were to go down the path that weakened democracy, Turkey would be weakening its strategic value for the United States.
Çongar: And that would also be weakening Turkey’s European hopes, don’t you think?
Bryza: That is a statement and, I think, it is a statement of fact. But Turkey’s European hopes in our mind remain strong. This is a critical period we are going through right now, but we are pleased at least so far that the European Commission recommended to continue the process, not to suspend it, not to stop it. And as Commissioner Olli Rehn has said there is no trainwreck and that is a very good thing.
Çongar: But the train is slowing down and some would say it is coming to a halt, a virtual halt. There will be a suspension of certain chapters in the accession talks, as you know. And we all know that President Bush said Turkey’s E.U. membership was very much in the U.S. national interest. Are you worried about the current situation? Is the U.S. involved in any way, shape or form in bringing the sides together, in working toward a solution?
Bryza: Well, whether we worry or not is not really relevant. That is an emotional description. There is a problem to be solved and we are all working in this together. But the United States is more of an observer than a participant. Obviously, it is a question between the E.U. and Turkey as to how quickly Turkey’s E.U. accession proceeds. From my perspective, we want to make sure that that train of Turkey’s E.U. accession moves as quickly down the tracks as Turkey itself decides. In other words, as Turkey fulfills the criteria of accession, Turkey moves closer to the E.U. accession. Right now, the key is to work together with Turkey to make sure Turkey is demonstrating its readiness to, number one, advance its reforms, and everybody knows what those are. They are stipulated by the E.U. criteria. It is not the United States telling Turkey what it should do. We are just observing while this is what the E.U. has said its criteria are. And certainly, there does need to be some progress on Cyprus. The E.U. has decided or has recommended in terms of the Commission what that progress would mean. You know what that is. It is opening up ports to Greek Cypriot ships and goods. But we also understand that the European Union has made a commitment to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. And we hope there will be some way, in the context of these mutual commitments of both of Turkey and the E.U. to each other, to move forward before the European Council meeting on December 14.
Çongar: Two questions on those two issues you referred to. First, on reforms. One of those reforms which the U.S. has, excuse me, the E.U. has been pushing for is civilian control of the military in Turkey. Does the U.S. share the view that this is a necessary step to take?
Bryza: Well, it is a statement of fact that in terms of the E.U. stated criteria that is a step to take. It is a different question whether the United States is pressing or encouraging Turkey to take the same reforms that the E.U. is encouraging. I would simply say that we deeply appreciate the peculiar, in fact, in some ways unique historical role that the Turkish military has played as well as in many ways as the custodian, the keeper of the basic ideas of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Atatürk’s ideas are basically non-controversial in Turkey. Whether someone is an activist in the Ak Party or in one of the secular parties, purely secular parties, either way all politicians embrace Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his brilliance and the enormous contributions he made not just to Turkish history, but European history as well. That is not controversial at all.
Çongar: And on Cyprus. As you said, the E.U. is demanding Ankara admit Cypriot ships and goods as part of the Customs Union. But isn’t it true that the E.U. has not lived up to its own pledge of lifting the isolation of Turkish Cypriots?
Bryza: Well, yeah, I referred to that a little while ago. Yeah, back last October 3rd, when Turkey undertook an obligation, a sovereign obligation it undertook on its own free will, to open its ports to Greek Cypriot ships and goods, the E.U. did also pledge, well earlier I guess, back in April of 2004 after the referanda on Cyprus, to restore trade from the area administered by Turkish Cypriots into the E.U. at the same level as E.U. customs, as is in the E.U. Customs Union. Yeah, and the E.U. has not fulfilled that obligation, so that is, what you said, is a statement of fact. And so what I have been saying is, it seems that a logical way forward out of this is for both Turkey and the E.U. to fulfill the commitments that each made to each other on both of these issues you raised.
Çongar: Very quickly, the U.S. also made a pledge to Turkey, didn’t it? Just before the referenda in Cyprus if you remember. I remember interviewing Secretary of State Colin Powell at the time who said “We will not let the Turkish Cyriots be punished for their decision, we wıll work toward the lifting of the isolation.” Do you think the U.S. government has done enough?
Bryza: I don’t recall that particular statement by Secretary Powell as deeply as I respect him. I will say that I don’t feel Turkish Cypriots are being punished at all. On the contrary, I think the international community welcomes, embraces the Turkish Cypriots for having voted in favor of the Annan Plan which meant not so much that the Annan Plan was the key, the only solution, but that the people, the Turkish Cypriot people had decided in favor of reunification of their island and reunification into a bizonal, bicommunal federation. The United States government has strongly supported that position for decades, so we can only commend the Turkish Cypriot people for making that choice and we have reached out to them. We have done a number things to show our respect, to try to ease the isolation of Turkish Cypriots.
Çongar: Okay. One last and slightly unrelated question on the PKK, about this decision in California. I understand a federal judge is now calling the freezing of the assets of organizations like the PKK illegal. What is the U.S. government’s understanding of this decision and how will the Bush administration fight it?
Bryza: Well, I personally am not a lawyer and haven’t had a chance to sit down with our lawyers and figure out exactly how to interprete that decision. And that will be happening now. I don’t even know the extent of which this is a final decision. But of course, I have no choice but to respect the separation of powers and if there is a court decision, of course we have to follow it. That said, as far as I am concerned and we are concerned here at the State Department and the executive branch, we are continuing full force ahead, full speed ahead, with all our efforts to eliminate the terrorist threat of the PKK. We are doing that in Iraq with General Ralston and I spent much of yesterday with him, talking through our next steps in Iraq, with the government of Iraq figting the PKK. We are also pursuing the PKK in Europe, undermining its support mechanisms, its financial mechanisms. And we are also working with the government of Turkey when asked to to help the Turkish government. We are offering information sharing as well.
Çongar: And on that note, thank you very much Mr. Bryza for your time.
Bryza: Thank you for yours Yasemin. It is nice to see you.
